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Abstract
Copying the majority is generally an adaptive social learning strategy but the majority does not always know best. Previous
work has demonstrated young children’s selective uptake of information from a consensus over a lone dissenter. The
current study examined children’s flexibility in following the majority: do they overextend their reliance on this heuristic to
situations where the dissenting individual has privileged knowledge and should be trusted instead? Four- to six- year-olds
(N = 103) heard conflicting claims about the identity of hidden drawings from a majority and a dissenter in two between-
subject conditions: in one, the dissenter had privileged knowledge over the majority (he drew the pictures); in the other he
did not (they were drawn by an absent third party). Overall, children were less likely to trust the majority in the Privileged
Dissenter condition. Moreover, 5- and 6- year-olds made majority-based inferences when the dissenter had no privileged
knowledge but systematically endorsed the dissenter when he drew the pictures. The current findings suggest that by 5
years, children are able to make an epistemic-based judgment to decide whether or not to follow the majority rather than
automatically following the most common view.
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Introduction
Think back to the last time you consulted customer reviews
online to decide whether or not to purchase the latest bestseller, or
that time you forgot your conference program and were not sure
where to go for the Keynote Address. Chances are that in both
cases you followed the majority. Although the reliability of others’
testimony is variable, when a number of individuals converge on a
particular view we feel more confident that it is correct and can be
trusted ([1], see [2] for review). It is the shared perspective among
multiple people that strengthens the credibility of the testimony. At
the same time, we tend to place less weight on the dissenting
opinion or actions of lone individuals (e.g., the one ‘poor’
compared to forty ‘excellent’ reviews on that novel, or the one
person who heads toward the stairs while everyone else makes
their way down the corridor at the conference). This is an adaptive
heuristic as, in general, a view that is endorsed by several people is
more reliable than the potentially idiosyncratic or false belief of
one individual (see [3–5]). However, the majority does not always
know best. There may be circumstances where a dissenting
individual has privileged knowledge over the majority due to
having expertise (e.g., a literary critic) or access to particular
information that others are not privy to (e.g., a conference delegate
who has heard that the Keynote Address has been moved to a
different location due to a technical fault with the equipment). In
such cases, it would be maladaptive to discount the dissenter in
favor of the consensual view.
In line with mounting evidence of children’s selective trust in
testimony (e.g., [6], see [7] for review), recent findings suggest that
sensitivity to social consensus constrains children’s learning from a
young age. Corriveau et al. [8] presented children with a language
task where they were faced with conflicting information about the
object referents of novel labels. Preschoolers selectively endorsed
the majority view over the view of a lone dissenter (see also [9]). In
the case of conventional knowledge such as language, where the
maintenance of word meanings depends on shared agreement
[10], following the majority is clearly the sensible thing to do.
However, we do not currently know whether children overextend
their reliance on this cue to situations where the dissenting
individual has privileged knowledge over the majority and should
therefore be trusted instead. Under such circumstances, they may
continue to endorse the majority for a number of reasons: a
preference to conform to the group; the greater salience of the
more common view; a failure to recognize the dissenter’s
privileged knowledge; or a misguided belief that the majority are
always correct.
Previous literature suggests that children can be flexible when
applying certain criteria for selective trust (see [11] for review). For
example, children generally prefer to learn from adults over other
children; however, this preference is reversed when the adult
informant is shown to be less accurate than the child, or when the
knowledge domain pertains to child-relevant subject matter such
as toys [12], [13]. Similarly, from the age of 4 years, children cease
trusting a familiar over an unfamiliar speaker, as well as a speaker
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with a native-accent over one with a foreign accent (both default
biases), if the familiar or native-accent speaker proves to be less
accurate than the unfamiliar or foreign-accent speaker, respec-
tively [14], [15]. Finally, 4-year-olds, who typically mistrust an
informant who has been incorrect in the past, will learn from a
previously inaccurate informant whose errors arose legitimately
from inadequate information access [16].
The present study was designed to investigate children’s
flexibility in using consensus information. Specifically, we exam-
ined whether the heuristic to follow the majority would be
overridden by an epistemic-based judgment that takes into
account the underlying knowledge of informants. To find out,
the majority was pitted against a lone dissenter in two between-
subject conditions: in one the dissenter had privileged knowledge
over the majority; in the other he did not. Would children rigidly
side with the majority in both conditions, or would they refrain
from doing so when the dissenter was in the best position to know
the truth? We focused on 4- to 6- year-olds to capture the age
range in which children have been shown to follow the majority,
and to apply other trust heuristics flexibly according to context.
Participants were presented with conflicting testimony from four
informants (three consensual claims vs. one dissenting claim) on
the basis of which they had to guess the identity of hidden
drawings. In the condition where the dissenter had privileged
knowledge (PD), he drew the pictures whereas in the non-
privileged dissenter (NPD) condition, the pictures had been drawn
by an absent third party. Drawing provided a suitable context for
our task for two reasons. The majority could be assumed to have
relevant knowledge on the question at stake. They had seen the
picture and could therefore be expected to know its identity.
Nevertheless, the artist, by virtue of having created the picture,
was in a privileged position to know what it depicted, i.e., his
intention defined it. A circle on a page may look like a ball to
several people but if the individual who drew it intended it to be an
orange then the convention is to accept it as an orange.
Knowledge about the importance of artist intent is acquired early.
Preschoolers reason about the creator’s intention when attributing
labels to drawings [17]. Similarly, they are more likely to accept an
unexpected label for an artifact when that label was provided by
the artifact’s creator than by someone who merely discovered it
[18]. One could therefore assume that children in the PD
condition would be aware of the artist’s privileged knowledge
compared to that of the other informants. Of interest was whether
they would overcome the tendency to follow the majority and
instead trust the claims of the dissenter when asked to infer what
he drew.
In addition to the forced-choice response, participants were
asked to justify their decision on every trial. This afforded an
examination of whether they would explicitly verbalize their a)
reliance on the majority and b) awareness of the dissenter’s
privileged knowledge in the PD condition. Although previous
studies have demonstrated the early influence of the majority on
children’s trust, we do not currently know whether children can
explicitly reflect on their use of this cue.
Method
Ethics statement
This research was approved by the University Research Ethics
Committee at Oxford Brookes University, and was conducted in
accordance with British Psychological Society ethical guidelines.
Participants’ parents provided written informed consent.
Participants
One hundred and three children participated in the study.
There were thirty-two 4-year-olds (M=4;6, range 3;11 to 4;11; 14
boys and 18 girls), forty 5-year-olds (M=5;5, range 5;0 to 5;11; 23
boys and 17 girls) and thirty-one 6-year-olds (M=6;6, range = 6;0
to 6;10; 18 boys and 13 girls). All children were native English
speakers, recruited from four schools in predominantly White
middle-class neighborhoods.
Materials
Four child-like boy hand puppets with moveable mouths and
hands acted as the informants. Puppets, presented live, were used
in order to make the task as interactive and engaging as possible
for participants. (See e.g., [19], [20] for previous studies that have
demonstrated children’s selective trust while using puppets as the
informants.) There were eight picture cards that matched up in
pairs according to shape (orange/ball, snake/rope, crescent
moon/banana, bat/pencil), a wall used as an occluder, a pen
and small sheets of plain paper, and an envelope addressed to the
experimenter (E) containing plain paper for the NPD condition.
Design and Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet area near their
classroom. In each age group, participants were randomly
assigned to either the privileged dissenter (PD) or non-privileged
dissenter (NPD) condition. Testing began with a sorting warmup to
introduce children to the stimuli and set the context for the
ambiguity of the drawings and conflicting responses given by the
informants in the trust task. Eight picture cards were placed in a
random order on the table and children were asked to sort them
into pairs according to shape. All children were able to complete
this successfully. E pointed to each of the pairs in turn, confirmed
that it was correct and asked children why the pictures went
together. All children responded correctly either verbally e.g.,
‘‘because they are both round’’ or by producing a gesture
indicating their similar shape, e.g., tracing the squiggly contour of
the snake and rope.
The trust task followed. Children were introduced to four
puppet informants who would play a game with them. E put all
the picture pairs to one side except for the orange/ball pair and
asked the child, ‘‘Can you tell me what these things are?’’ All
children were able to label the pictures correctly. The procedure
then differed according to condition:
In the PD condition, E held up one of the puppets (designated as
the drawing dissenter throughout the trials) and said, ‘‘This puppet
is going to draw one of these pictures, either a ball or an orange,
but he is going to do it behind this wall [puts up occluder] so you
won’t be able to see which one he draws. But after he finishes, all
the puppets will have a look at the picture and we’ll ask them what
he drew, and then you can guess at the end.’’ E cleared away the
orange and ball pictures, handed the puppet a pen and placed a
piece of paper behind the occluder. The puppet then ‘drew’ the
picture out of the child’s sight. When it was finished children
watched as each of the puppets in turn was shown behind the
barrier and asked, ‘‘What did he/you draw?’’ Note that each
puppet answered separately while the other puppets were placed
behind E’s back ‘‘so they won’t be able to hear anything’’. The
drawing puppet gave one response, ‘‘an orange’’ while the other
three puppets gave the same alternative response, ‘‘a ball’’. The
order in which the puppets responded (majority followed by
dissenter or vice versa) alternated across the four trials, with half of
the children in each age group and condition viewing a MD–DM–
MD–DM sequence and the other a DM–MD–DM–MD sequence
(where M= majority, and D= dissenter). The specific label
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endorsed by the majority and the drawing dissenter, respectively,
and the identity of the drawing dissenter were also counterbal-
anced across participants. Children were given a summary of the
informants’ claims: ‘‘So he said he drew [an orange] and they said
he drew [a ball]’’ in the same order as the speakers had responded.
Children were then asked the Test question: ‘‘Now it’s your turn to
decide, what do you think he drew, [an orange] or [a ball]?’’
Participants were also asked to justify their decision, ‘‘Why do you
think that?’’ No feedback was given except for neutral encour-
agement. The above procedure was repeated for three further
trials using the remaining picture pairs.
In the NPD condition, E also kept the orange/ball picture pair
in front of the participant and said, ‘‘My brother Larry really likes
to draw pictures. He drew some pictures for me and sent them
over in the mail because he lives far away. I asked Larry to draw a
picture of either a ball or an orange. I wonder which one he
drew.’’ E then held up one of the puppets (designated as the
helping dissenter throughout the trials) and said to it, ‘‘Can you
please get the envelope Larry sent me?’’ The puppet replied,
‘‘OK!’’ rummaged around in E’s bag and brought out the
envelope saying ‘‘Here it is!’’ E then explained, ‘‘Now in this game,
I’m going to put this wall up [puts up occluder] and this puppet
will put the picture that Larry drew behind the wall so you won’t
be able to see what it is. But then all the puppets will have a look at
the picture and we’ll ask them what he drew, and you can guess at
the end.’’ The puppet pulled out the drawing from the envelope
and put it down behind the occluder where it could not be seen by
the child. In this way, the dissenting puppet’s association with the
pictures matched the PD condition, the only difference being that
in the PD condition the puppet drew the pictures whereas in the
NPD condition he only handled them. Children then watched as
each of the puppets in turn was shown behind the barrier and
asked ‘‘What did Larry draw?’’ The puppets’ responses and
counterbalancing procedures were identical to the PD condition.
Children were asked the Test question, ‘‘So he said Larry drew [an
orange] and they said Larry drew [a ball]. What do you think
Larry drew, [an orange] or [a ball]?’’ In addition, participants
were asked to justify their decision. The above procedure was
repeated for three further trials using the remaining picture pairs.
Coding
The main interest in looking at children’s justifications was to
examine the rates at which they would refer to the authority of the
majority and/or the knowledge of the privileged dissenter.
Responses were only rated as such if children referred to the
frequency of the majority opinion (e.g., ‘‘More voted for it’’;
‘‘Three of them said it’’) or to the fact that the dissenter drew the
picture (e.g., ‘‘He knows what he’s drawn’’; ‘‘He drew it, they
don’t really know’’). Answers that simply referred to the identity of
the speaker who said the same as the child without showing further
insight were not included (e.g., ‘‘Because he said it’’; ‘‘They said
it.’’) but were coded separately. Alternative explanations in both
conditions fell into one of the following categories: description of
the hidden drawing (e.g., ‘‘Because bananas are healthy’’) or
residual (any other response, including ‘‘Because they’re lying’’;
‘‘Because it is’’; ‘‘Don’t know’’ or no response). This coding
scheme was used to individually code every trial for each
participant. A second independent rater coded half of the
responses (52 participants 64 trials = 208 justifications) and
interrater agreement (agreements/agreements + disagreements)
was 94%. Disagreements were resolved by discussion. Participants
received an overall categorization that reflected his or her most
frequent explanation type across the four trials. Participants who
cited two or more explanation types with the same frequency were
classified as ‘mixed’. However, if authority of the majority/drawer
was one of these explanation types (e.g., two ‘majority/drawer’
justifications and two ‘they/he said it’ justifications), the majority/
drawer classification was given to avoid underrating participants’
awareness of these relevant criteria.
Results
Judgments
Participants received 1 point every time they endorsed the claim
made by the majority for a maximum of 4 points. Preliminary
analysis indicated no significant effects of gender, counterbalanc-
ing sequence or identity of dissenter puppet; therefore, the data
were collapsed on these dimensions. Table 1 presents the mean
number of times participants endorsed the majority view when
guessing the identity of the pictures by age and condition. Table 2
shows performance on an individual basis, i.e., the number of
participants who predominantly endorsed the majority, the
dissenter, or were ambivalent across the 4 trials.
A 3 (age: 4 year-olds, 5-year-olds, 6 year-olds) 62 (condition:
PD, NPD) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted on participants’ scores. The ANOVA confirmed a main
effect of condition, F(1, 97) = 59.20, p,.001, g2 = .38, with
participants overall being less likely to side with the majority when
the dissenting puppet had privileged knowledge (M=1.00,
SD=1.40) than when it did not (M=2.98, SD=1.29). There
was no main effect of age, F(2, 97) = 1.50, p= .23, g2 = .03. The
interaction between age and condition was significant, F(2, 97)
= 3.21, p= .045, g2 = .06. To interpret the interaction, the simple
effect of condition was calculated for each age group. All three age
groups were significantly less likely to side with the majority in the
Table 1. Mean number of times participants endorsed the majority view (maximum score = 4) by age and condition and
comparisons against chance performance.
Condition
Privileged dissenter Non-privileged dissenter
Age group Mean (SD) t d Mean (SD) t d
4-year-olds 1.06 (1.48) 22.53* 2.64 2.31 (1.40) .89 .22
5-year-olds 1.30 (1.49) 22.10* 2.47 3.15 (1.14)** 4.52 1.01
6-year-olds 0.56 (1.15) 24.99** 21.25 3.47 (1.13)** 5.05 1.30
*p,.05;
**p,.001 when comparing with a chance score of 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104585.t001
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PD than the NPD condition: 4-year-olds, F(1, 97) = 7.27, p= .008,
g2 = .07; 5-year-olds, F(1, 97) = 19.90, p,.001, g2 = .17; 6-year-
olds, F(1, 97) = 37.97, p,.001, g2 = .28. In addition, the simple
effect of age was calculated separately for each condition. This
effect was significant in the NPD condition, F(2, 97) = 3.27,
p= .042, g2 = .06, but not in the PD condition F(2, 97) = 1.43,
p= .24, g2 = .03. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjust-
ment showed that 6-year-olds were more likely to endorse the
majority in the NPD condition than 4-year-olds. The remaining
comparisons were not significant.
Planned comparisons against a chance score of 2 (probability of
success =K for each trial multiplied by 4) are also shown on
Table 1. These found that 5- and 6- year-olds made majority-
based inferences when the dissenter had no privileged knowledge
but systematically endorsed the dissenter when it drew the pictures
(all ps,.05). In contrast, 4-year-olds systematically endorsed the
drawing dissenter in the PD condition but did not perform
differently to chance in the NPD condition.
Finally, performance did not differ systematically across trials in
either condition. The percentage of children who endorsed the
majority in the NPD condition was 71%, 78%, 73% and 76% on
the first, second, third, and fourth trials respectively, Cochran’s
Q(3) = 1.67, p= .64. The percentage of children who endorsed the
majority in the PD condition was 21%, 21%, 27% and 31% on the
first, second, third, and fourth trials respectively, Cochran’s Q(3)
= 3.86, p= .28.
Justifications
When asked to justify their decision in the NPD condition, there
was a sharp rise in children’s ability to verbalize their use of the
majority heuristic between 5 and 6 years of age. Many of the 6-
year-olds (80%) referred to the authority of the majority as their
most frequent explanation across the 4 trials, whereas younger
children were much less likely to respond in this way (4-year-olds
= 38%; 5-year-olds = 40%). In the PD condition, reference to the
authority of the privileged dissenter increased steadily with age:
6.3% 4-year-olds, 25% 5-year-olds, and 50% 6-year-olds provided
this as their most frequent explanation across trials. Very few
children (8% overall) cited the majority opinion in the PD
condition. Alternative explanations in both conditions referred to
the identity of the speaker who gave the same answer as the child
without showing further insight; gave a description of the hidden
drawing or failed to give a meaningful justification. The number of
times children justified their choice with reference to the majority
was positively correlated with the number of times they endorsed
the majority’s opinion, r(101) = .70, p,.001.
Discussion
Previous studies have shown that children recognize agreement
among individuals and are more likely to copy information
provided by the majority than a dissenter [8], [9], [21]. The
current findings are the first to demonstrate that trust in the
majority is flexible in children aged 5 and 6 years. As expected,
they showed higher levels of trust in the majority over the dissenter
about the identity of hidden pictures that were drawn by an absent
third party and were therefore equally unfamiliar to all of the
informants. By contrast, when the dissenter had privileged
knowledge about the pictures by virtue of having drawn them,
children selectively trusted his testimony even though it conflicted
with the majority. These findings are consistent with previous
findings showing that children can be flexible when applying
criteria for trust by taking into account informants’ past accuracy
or their underlying knowledge (e.g., [12], [16]). As Wood et al.
[11] note this flexibility may be important because it enables
children to ‘‘continually source and copy the ‘best’ model’’ (p.
346).
Although 4-year-olds were less likely to endorse the majority in
the PD compared to the NPD condition, they did not systemat-
ically favor the majority view in the NPD condition, suggesting
that they did not generally accord the majority special authority.
This result is surprising given preschoolers’ preference for the
majority in Corriveau et al. ’s study [8]. However, it is consistent
with recent data by Seston Schillaci and Keleman [22]. In their
study, 3- and 4- year-olds did not reliably agree with the majority
when judging the functions of novel objects. In trying to account
for their contrasting findings with Corriveau et al., the authors
proposed that domain differences in the content of information to
be learnt may play a role. Specifically, they suggested that children
may show greater susceptibility to social cues like consensus when
it comes to learning about socially constructed conventions such as
object labels than when learning about less arbitrary object
functions that offer children ‘‘some independent, objective basis
for judgment’’ (p. 11). In the current study, there was no objective
basis for judgment as the drawings were kept hidden from sight,
precisely to avoid the child simply basing their decision on what
the picture looked more like to them (piloting found this to be a
common strategy). Moreover, the task did involve making
judgments about object labels as in Corriveau et al. Thus, Seston
Schillaci and Keleman’s explanation cannot account for the
negative finding obtained here. An alternative explanation is that
whereas in Corriveau et al. the informants’ consensus was
displayed via a simultaneous pointing cue, in the current study
and in Seston Schillaci and Keleman’s procedure, the testimony
was conveyed verbally and sequentially. Perhaps when children
Table 2. Number of participants who predominantly sided with the majority, the dissenter or were ambivalent in the privileged
dissenter (PD) and non-privileged dissenter (NPD) conditions by age.
PD NPD
Dissenter Ambivalent Majority Dissenter Ambivalent Majority
Age group
4-year-olds 11 2 3 6 3 7
5-year-olds 12 4 4 2 2 16
6-year-olds 13 2 1 2 1 12
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104585.t002
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first begin attending to agreement and disagreement among
informants they require a salient visual depiction of individuals’
views in order to form a representation of the agreement between
them that is sufficiently strong to influence who they trust (see [22]
for a related argument). Indeed, Haun et al. [21] found that
children as young as 2 years were more likely to act on a novel
apparatus in accordance with a behavior demonstrated by a
majority of peers than the behavior of a dissenter. Therefore, it is
also possible that by using action-based paradigms, researchers will
uncover flexible trust in the majority at an earlier age than that
demonstrated here. Nevertheless, the justifications data suggest
that even though young children may be influenced implicitly by
the majority, the development of children’s explicit awareness of
this heuristic (or at least their ability to verbalize it) is more
protracted, becoming generally prevalent at 6 years of age.
In sum, children do not rigidly follow the most frequent opinion;
they favor the minority view when it is likely to be more informed.
The current findings suggest that by 5 years, children are able to
make an epistemic-based judgment to decide whether or not to
follow the majority. It is worth noting, however, that the respective
weights of the majority and dissenter in any given situation may
influence children’s decisions. We only used one particular
measure of majority consensus: the testimony of three puppets,
instead of a group of peers. Under such conditions, children’s
conformist tendency is likely to have been driven primarily by
‘informational conformity’ (the motivation to obtain accurate
information about reality) rather than ‘normative conformity’ (the
motivation to maintain and develop group identity; for review see
[2]). It is possible that in circumstances where normative
conformity would be expected to play a greater role (i.e., inducing
a strong desire to belong to the group), children would be less
flexible in dismissing the majority view despite attributing greater
knowledge to the dissenter. Finally, privileged knowledge is just
one reason why an individual’s claim may be more reliable than
that of the majority. Future research should seek to establish
whether children’s trust in the majority would be similarly
moderated in other situations where it would be wiser to listen
to the lone voice in the crowd.
Acknowledgments
Grateful acknowledgement is extended to parents and children who gave
their consent to participate in this experiment and to the kind cooperation
of local schools. Thanks also to Lucy England for her assistance in data
collection and to Liz Robinson for helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: SE. Performed the experiments:
SE. Analyzed the data: SE. Contributed to the writing of the manuscript:
SE.
References
1. Kelley HH (1973) The process of causal attribution. American psychologist 28:
107–128.
2. Claidiere N, Whiten A (2012) Integrating the Study of Conformity and Culture
in Humans and Nonhuman Animals. Psychological Bulletin 138: 126–145. doi:
10.1037/a0025868
3. Boyd R, Richerson PJ (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
4. Henrich J, Boyd R (1998) The evolution of conformist transmission and the
emergence of between-group differences. Evolution & Human Behavior 19:
215–242. doi: 10.1016/S1090-5138(98)00018-X
5. Laland KL (2004) Social learning strategies. Learning & Behavior 32: 4–14.
doi:10.3758/BF03196002
6. Koenig MA, Harris PL (2005) Preschoolers mistrust ignorant and inaccurate
speakers. Child Development 76: 1261–1277. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2005.00849.x
7. Mills CM (2013) Knowing when to doubt: Developing a critical stance when
learning from others. Developmental Psychology 49: 404–418. doi: 10.1037/
a0029500.
8. Corriveau KH, Fusaro M, Harris PL (2009) Going with the flow: Preschoolers
prefer non-dissenters as informants. Psychological Science 20: 372–377. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02291.x
9. Chen EE, Corriveau KH, Harris PL (2013) Children Trust a Consensus
Composed of Outgroup Members—But Do Not Retain That Trust. Child
Development 84: 269–282. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01850.x
10. Sabbagh MA, Henderson AME (2007) How an appreciation of conventionality
shapes early word learning. New Directions in Child and Adolescent
Development 115: 25–37. doi: 10.1002/cad.180
11. Wood LA, Kendal RL, Flynn EG (2013) Whom do children copy? Model-based
biases in social learning. Developmental Review 33: 341–356. doi: 10.1016/
j.dr.2013.08.002
12. Jaswal VK, Neely LA (2006) Adults don’t always know best: Preschoolers use
past reliability over age when learning new words. Psychological Science 17:
757–758. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01778.x
13. VanderBorght M, Jaswal VK (2009) Who knows best? Preschoolers sometimes
prefer child informants over adult informants. Infant and Child Development
18: 61–71. doi: 10.1002/icd.591
14. Corriveau KH, Harris PL (2009) Choosing your informant: Weighing familiarity
and recent accuracy. Developmental Science 12: 426–437. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2008.00792.x.
15. Corriveau KH, Kinzler KD, Harris PL (2013) Accuracy trumps accent in
children’s endorsement of object labels. Developmental Psychology 49: 470–479.
doi: 10.1037/a0030604
16. Nurmsoo E, Robinson EJ (2009) Children’s trust in previously inaccurate
informants who were well or poorly informed: When past errors can be excused.
Child Development 80: 23–27. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01243.x.
17. Preissler MA, Bloom P (2008) Two-year-olds use artist intention to understand
drawings. Cognition 106: 512–518. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.02.002
18. Jaswal VK (2006) Preschoolers favor the creator’s label when reasoning about an
artifact’s function. Cognition 99: B83–B92. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.
2005.07.006
19. Birch SAJ, Vauthier SA, Bloom P (2008) Three- and four-year-olds
spontaneously use others’ past performance to guide their learning. Cognition
107: 1018–1034. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.008
20. Einav S, Robinson EJ (2011) When being right is not enough: Four-year-olds
distinguish knowledgeable from merely accurate informants. Psychological
Science 22: 1250–1253. doi: 10.1177/0956797611416998
21. Haun DBM, Rekers Y, Tomasello M (2012) Chimpanzees and human children,
but not orangutans, prefer to learn from the majority. Current Biology 22: 727–
731. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2012.03.006
22. Seston Schillaci R, Keleman D (2013) Children’s conformity when acquiring
novel conventions: The case of artifacts. Journal of Cognition and Development
15: 1–15. doi:10.1080/15248372.2013.784973
Young Children’s Flexible Trust in Majority Opinion
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 August 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 8 | e104585
